Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - Sultan, Jennifer (2015-04-01) by unknown
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
NYS Supreme Court Decisions in Article 78 
Proceedings Court Litigation Documents 
September 2021 
Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - Sultan, Jennifer 
(2015-04-01) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pdd 
Recommended Citation 
"Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - Sultan, Jennifer (2015-04-01)" (2021). Parole Information 
Project 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pdd/317 
This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Court Litigation Documents at FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in NYS Supreme Court 
Decisions in Article 78 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of 
Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Sultan v Stanford
2015 NY Slip Op 30453(U)
April 1, 2015
Supreme Court, Albany County
Docket Number: 5601-14
Judge: Jr., George B. Ceresia
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
Op 30001(U), are republished from various state and
local government websites. These include the New York
State Unified Court System's E-Courts Service, and the
Bronx County Clerk's office.
This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official
publication.
ST ATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
JENNIFER SUL TAN, 
-against-
TINA M. STANFORD, Chairwoman, 
New York State Board of Parole, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Appearances: 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr. , Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 01 -14-ST6218 Index No. 5601-14 
The Legal Aid Society 
Attorney For Petitioner 
199 Water Street 
New York, NY 10038 
(Caroline Hsu, Staff Attorney, 
of Counsel) 
Eric T. Schneiderman 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The C_apitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Louis Jim, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate in the custody of the New York State Department of 
Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"), was convicted of the crimes of 
criminal sale of a controlled substance in the 2"d degree, and conspiracy in the 4th degree. 
She was received into custody by DOCCS on May 8, 2013, and credited with 300 days of jail 
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time. The sentencing judge recommended that she participate in the Shock Incarceration 
Program (see Correction Law § 865, et seq.). The successfu l completion of the Shock 
Incarceration Program renders an inmate eligible for early release, in advance of her initial 
parole date or her conditional release date. The petitioner entered the Program on June 27, 
2013, and completed it on December 26, 2013 . The Parole Board reviewed her record on 
December 6, 20 13, and on December 16, 2013 denied parole. The petitioner commenced the 
instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding challenging foregoing parole denial. The petitioner 
argues that the determination was arbitrary and capricious by reason of her successful 
completion of the Shock Incarceration Program, her otherwise clean criminal record, and 
because her COMP AS Risk Assessment Instrument evaluates her as having a low risk of 
recidivism. She also maintains that she was denied due process in that she was not was not 
permitted to personally appear before the Parole Board, but rather the determination was 
made upon review of the papers in her record. 
After commencement of the instant proceeding the petitioner reappeared before the 
Parole Board and was granted an open date for parole, with May 11, 20 15 being the earliest 
release date. Based upon the foregoing, the respondent has made a motion to dismiss the 
petition on grounds that the matter is now moot. The petitioner opposes the motion, arguing 
that she is challenging the constitutionality of Executive Law § 259-i (2) (e), which 
authorizes parole release determinations in connection with the Shock Incarceration Program 
to be made without a personal appearance before the Parole Board. 1 The petitioner also 
'Executive Law§ 259-i (2) (e) recites: 
"(e) Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of this 
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points out that she is challenging the alleged failure of the respondent to implement the 
provisions of the 2011 amendments to the xecutive Law (see Executive Law§ 259-c [4]), 
including adoption of written procedures to incorporate risk and needs principles to evaluate 
inmates for release. She maintains that both issues raise substantial and novel issues which 
typically evade review and are likely to recur. 
"It is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that the power of a court to declare 
the law only arises out of, and is limited to, determining the rights of persons which are 
actually controverted in a particular case pending before the tribunal" (see Hearst Corp. v 
Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, at 713 [ 1980], citations omitted; see also Matter of City of New York 
v New York State Public Employment Relations Board, 54 AD3d 480, 481-482 [3rd Dept., 
2008]). "This principle, which forbids courts to pass on academic, hypothetical, moot, or 
otherwise abstract questions, is founded both in constitutional separation-of-powers doctrine, 
and in methodological strictures which inhere in the decisional process of a common-law 
judiciary" (Hearst Corp. V Clyne, supra, at 713-714; see also Saratoga County Chamber of 
Commerce v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801, 810-811 [2003], cert denied 540 US 1017; Matter of 
NRG Energy, Inc. v Crotty, 18 AD3d 916, 918-919 [Yd Dept., 2005]). "An exception to the 
mootness doctrine may apply, however, where the issue to be decided, though moot, ( 1) is 
subdivision, the determination to parole an inmate who has 
successfully completed the shock incarceration program pursuant 
to section two hundred sixty-seven of the correction law may be 
made without a personal interview of the inmate and shall be made 
in accordance with procedures set forth in the rules of the board. If 
parole is not granted, the time period for reconsideration shall not 
exceed the court imposed minimum." (Executive § 259-i [2] [ e J) 
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likely to recur, either between the parties or other members of the public; (2) is substantial 
and novel and (3) will typically evade review in the courts" (Coleman v Daines, 19 NY3d 
1087, 1090 [2012], citing City of.New York v Maul, 14 NY3d 499, 507, [2010], and Matter 
of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, supra, at 714-715). 
It is well-settled that a reappearance before the Parole Board renders a challenge to 
a prior parole determination moot (see Matter of Bonez v State of New York, 100 AD3d 
1235 [3dDept., 2012]; Matter ofRusso vNew York State Division of Parole, 89 AD3d 1305 
[3d Dept., 2011]; Matter of Davidson v Evans, 84 AD3d 1599 [3d Dept., 2011]). The only 
issue then, is whether the petitioner has established the exception to the mootness doctrine. 
The issues concerning respondent's alleged failure to comply with the requirements 
of Executive Law § 259-c (4)2, and respondent's alleged failure to apply risk and need 
principles in making parole release determinations have, since 2011, frequently been litigated 
in the Courts. The issues are not novel, and cannot be said to evade review. 
With regard to Executive Law § 259-i (2) (e), the Court observes that it has been 
repeatedly held that Executive Law § 259-i does not create in any prisoner an entitlement to, 
or a legitimate expectation of, release; and therefore, no constitutionally protected liberty 
interest is implicated by the Parole Board's exercise of its discretion to deny parole (see 
Matter of Rodriguez v Alexander, 71 AD3d 1354 [Yd Dept., 20 I OJ; Barna v Travis, 239 F3d 
169, 171 [2d Cir. 2001]; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40, 44 [2d Cir., 2001]; Boothe v 
2The issue concerning the need to adopt formal regulations to implement Executive 
Law § 259-c ( 4) has been resolved in this Department in Matter of Montane v Evans ( 116 
AD3d 197, 200·303 [ed Dept., 2014], appeal dismissed 24 NY3d 1052 [2014]). 
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Hammock, 605 F2d 661, 664 [2d Cir. 1979]; Paunetto v Hammock, 516 F Supp 1367, 1367-
1368 [SD NY 1981]; Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 75-76, 
supra. Matter of Gamez v Dennison; 18 AD3d 1099 [3rd Dept 2005]; Matter of Lozada v 
New York State Div. of Parole, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept 2007]) . However; even if 
this particular issue could be deemed substantial and novel, and assuming that it may recur, 
the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it typically evades review. In this respect, the 
Court notes that in order to be eligible for participation in the Shock Incarceration Program, 
an inmate must be within three years of parole or conditional release (see Correction Law§ 
865 [l]). The Shock Incarceration Program is a six month program (see Correction Law§ 
865 [2]). For those inmates who are admitted to the Shock Incarceration Program soon after 
they become eligible, it would appear that they would have over two years to be heard on this 
issue in Supreme Court. The petitioner provides no data or information to support her 
nonfactual and conclusory assertion that the issue typically evades review in the courts. 
The Court finds that matter is now moot, and that it has not been demonstrated that 
the exception to the mootness doctrine applies. The Court concludes that respondent's 
motion must be granted and the petition dismissed. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED, that respondent's motion to dismiss the petition is granted; and it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original 
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondent. All other papers are 
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this 
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decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order(judgment does not constitute 
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable 
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. 
ENTER 
Dated: April / , 2015 
Troy, New York h G'!rg~ B. Ceresia, Jr. 
Supreme Court Justice 
Papers Considered: 
1. Amended Notice of Petition dated November 6, 2014 
2. Petition 
3. Affidavit of Jennifer Sultan, sworn to October 6, 2014 and Exhibits 
4. Notice of Motion dated January 9, 2015, Supporting Affirmation and Exhibit 
5. Affirmation in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss of Caroline Hsu, Esq., dated 
January 21, 2015 
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